A Nash equilibrium of a routing network represents a stable state of the network where no user finds it beneficial to unilaterally deviate from its routing strategy. In this work, we investigate the structure of such equilibria within the context of a certain game that models selfish routing for a set of n users each shipping its traffic over a network consisting of m parallel links. In particular, we are interested in identifying the worst-case Nash equilibrium -the one that maximizes social cost. Worst-case Nash equilibria were first introduced and studied in the pioneering work of Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [9] . More specifically, we continue the study of the Conjecture of the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium, henceforth abbreviated as FMNE Conjecture, which asserts that the fully mixed Nash equilibrium, when existing, is the worst-case Nash equilibrium. (In the fully mixed Nash equilibrium, the mixed strategy of each user assigns (strictly) positive probability to every link.) We report substantial progress towards identifying the validity, methodologies to establish, and limitations of, the FMNE Conjecture.
Introduction
Motivation and Framework. Nash equilibrium [12, 13] is arguably the most important solution concept in (non-cooperative) Game Theory a stable state of the play of a strategic game in which each player holds an accurate opinion about the (expected) behavior of other players and acts rationally. Understanding the combinatorial structure of Nash equilibria is a necessary prerequisite to either designing efficient algorithms to compute them, or establishing corresponding hardness and thereby designing (efficient) approximation algorithms 2 . In this work, we embark on a systematic study of the combinatorial structure of Nash equilibria in the context of a simple routing game that models selfish routing over a non-cooperative network such as the Internet. This game was originally introduced in a pioneering work of Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [9] ; that work defined coordination ratio (also known as price of anarchy [15] ) as a worst-case measure of the impact of the selfish behavior of users on the efficiency of routing over a non-cooperative network operating at a Nash equilibrium. As a worst-case measure, the coordination ratio bounds the maximum loss of efficiency due to selfish behavior of users at the worst-case Nash equilibrium; in sharp contrast, the principal motivation of our work is to identify the actual worst-case Nash equilibrium of the selfish routing game.
Within the framework of the selfish routing game of Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [9] , we assume a collection of n users, each employing a mixed strategy, which is a probability distribution over m parallel links, to control the shipping of its own assigned traffic. For each link, a capacity specifies the rate at which the link processes traffic. In a Nash equilibrium, each user selfishly routes its traffic on those links that minimize its expected latency cost, given the network congestion caused by the other users. The social cost of a Nash equilibrium is the expectation, over all random choices of the users, of the maximum, over all links, latency through a link. The worst-case Nash equilibrium is one that maximizes social cost.
Our study distinguishes between pure Nash equilibria, where each user chooses exactly one link (with probability one), and mixed Nash equilibria, where the choices of each user are modeled by a probability distribution over links. Of special interest to our work is the fully mixed Nash equilibrium [10] , where each user chooses each link with non-zero probability; henceforth, denote F the fully mixed Nash equilibrium. We will also introduce and study disjointly mixed Nash equilibria, where (loosely speaking) mixed strategies of different users do not intersect.
Allowing link capacities to vary arbitrarily gives rise to the standard model of related links, also known as model of uniform links in the scheduling literature (cf. Gonzales et al. [5] ); the name is due to the fact that the order of the delays a user experiences on each of the links is the same across all users. A special case of the model of related links is the model of identical links, where all link capacities are equal (cf. Graham [6] ); thus, in this model, each user incurs the same delay on all links. We also consider the model of unrelated links, where instead of associating a traffic and a capacity with each user and link, respec-tively, we assign a delay for each pair of a user and a link in an arbitrary way (cf. Horowitz and Sahni [7] ); thus, in the unrelated links model, there is no relation between the delays incurred to a user on different links. Reciprocally, in the model of identical traffics, all user traffics are equal; they may vary arbitrarily in the model of arbitrary traffics. We are interested in understanding the impact of model assumptions on links and users on the patterns of the worst-case Nash equilibria for the selfish routing game we consider.
Results and Contribution. In this work, we embark on a systematic study of a natural conjecture due to Gairing et al. [4] , which asserts that the fully mixed Nash equilibrium is the worst-case Nash equilibrium (with respect to social cost).
Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture [4] . Consider the model of arbitrary traffics and related links. Then, for any traffic vector w such that the fully mixed Nash equilibrium F exists, and for any Nash equilibrium P, SC (w, P) ≤ SC (w, F).
Henceforth, abbreviate the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture as the FMNE Conjecture. Our study reports substantial progress towards the settlement of the FMNE Conjecture:
-We prove the FMNE Conjecture for several interesting special cases of it (within the model of related links). -In doing so, we provide proof techniques and tools which, while applicable to interesting special cases of it, may suffice for the general case as well. -We reveal limitations of the FMNE Conjecture by establishing that it is not, in general, valid over the model of unrelated links; we present both positive and negative instances for the conjecture.
Related Work, Comparison and Significance. The selfish routing game considered in this paper was first introduced and studied in the pioneering work of Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [9] . This game was subsequently studied in the work of Mavronicolas and Spirakis [10] , where fully mixed Nash equilibria were introduced and analyzed. Both works focused mainly on proving bounds on coordination ratio. Subsequent works that provided bounds on coordination ratio include [1, 2, 8] . The work of Fotakis et al. [3] was the first to study the combinatorial structure and the computational complexity of Nash equilibria for the selfish routing game we consider; that work was subsequently extended by Gairing et al. [4] . (See details below.) The closest to our work are the one by Fotakis et al. [3] and the one by Gairing et al. [4] .
-The FMNE Conjecture has been inspired by two results due to Fotakis et al. [3] The ultimate settlement of the FMNE Conjecture (for the model of related links) may reveal an interesting complexity-theoretic contrast between the worstcase pure and the worst-case mixed Nash equilibria. On one hand, identifying the worst-case pure Nash equilibrium is an N P-hard problem [3, Theorem 4]; on the other hand, if the FMNE Conjecture is valid, identification of the worstcase mixed Nash equilibrium is immediate in the cases where the fully mixed Nash equilibrium exists. (In addition, the characterization of the fully mixed Nash equilibrium shown in [10, Theorem 14] implies that such existence can be checked in polynomial time.)
Road Map. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our definitions and some preliminaries. The case of disjointly mixed Nash equilibria is treated in Section 3. Section 4 considers the case of identical traffics and related links with n = 2. The reciprocal case of identical traffics and identical links with m = 2 is studied in Section 5. Section 6 examines the case of unrelated links. We conclude, in Section 7, with a discussion of our results and some open problems.
Framework
Most of our definitions are patterned after those in [ General. We consider a network consisting of a set of m parallel links 1, 2, . . . , m from a source node to a destination node. Each of n network users 1, 2, . . . , n, or users for short, wishes to route a particular amount of traffic along a (non-fixed) link from source to destination. (Throughout, we will be using subscripts for users and superscripts for links.) In the model of related links, denote w i the A pure strategy for user i ∈ [n] is some specific link. A mixed strategy for user i ∈ [n] is a probability distribution over pure strategies; thus, a mixed strategy is a probability distribution over the set of links. The support of the mixed strategy for user i ∈ [n], denoted support(i), is the set of those pure strategies (links) to which i assigns positive probability. A pure strategy profile is represented by an n-tuple 1 
n ; a mixed strategy profile is represented by an n × m probability matrix P of nm probabilities p , denoted λ i , is the expectation, over all random choices of the remaining users, of the latency cost for user i had its traffic been assigned to link ; thus,
For each user i ∈ [n], the minimum expected latency cost, denoted λ i , is the minimum, over all links ∈ [m], of the expected latency cost for user i on link ; thus,
Associated with a traffic vector w and a mixed strategy profile P is the social cost [9, Section 2], denoted SC(w, P), which is the expectation, over all random choices of the users, of the maximum (over all links) latency of traffic through a link; thus,
Note that SC (w, P) reduces to the maximum latency through a link in the case of pure strategies. On the other hand, the social optimum [9, Section 2] associated with a traffic vector w, denoted OPT(w), is the least possible maximum (over all links) latency of traffic through a link. Note that while SC(w, P) is defined in relation to a mixed strategy profile P, OPT(w) refers to the optimum pure strategy profile.
In the model of unrelated links, the latency of user i on link l is its cost C il . Thus, the expected latency cost of user i on link l translates to λ
C kl , and the social cost, now depending on C and the strategy profile P, is defined by SC(C, P)=
Nash Equilibria. We are interested in a special class of mixed strategies called Nash equilibria [13] that we describe below. Formally, the probability matrix P is a Nash equilibrium [9, Section 2] if for all users i ∈ [n] and links ∈ [m], λ i = λ i if I i = 1, and λ i ≥ λ i if I i = 0. Thus, each user assigns its traffic with positive probability only on links for which its expected latency cost is minimized; this implies that there is no incentive for a user to unilaterally deviate from its mixed strategy in order to avoid links on which its expected latency cost is higher than necessary. The coordination ratio [9] is the maximum value, over all traffic vectors w and Nash equilibria P of the ratio SC (w, P) /OPT (w). In the model of unrelated links, the coordination ratio translates to the maximum value of SC (C, P) /OPT (C).
Mavronicolas and Spirakis [10, Lemma 15] show that in the model of identical links, all links are equiprobable in a fully mixed Nash equilibrium. Gairing et al. [4, Lemma 4.1] show that in the model of related links, the minimum expected latency cost of any user i ∈ [n] in a Nash equilibrium P is bounded by its minimum expected latency cost in the fully mixed Nash equilibrium F.
Lemma 2 (Gairing et al. [4]).
Fix any traffic vector w, mixed Nash equilibrium P and user i. Then, λ i (w, P) ≤ λ i (w, F).
Disjointly Mixed versus Fully Mixed Nash Equilibria
In this section, we restrict ourselves to the case of disjointly mixed Nash equilibria, and we establish the FMNE Conjecture for this case. We prove: Theorem 1. Fix any traffic vector w such that F exists, and any disjointly mixed Nash equilibrium P. Then, SC (w, P) ≤ SC (w, F). 
Identical Traffics, Related Links and n = 2
In this section we restrict to 2 users with identical traffics, that is, w 1 = w 2 . Without loss of generality we assume w 1 = w 2 = 1 and
In the following, we denote by support (1) and support(2) the supports of user 1 and 2, respectively, and by p j i and f j i the probabilities for user i to choose link j in P and F, respectively. Since we consider two users with identical traffics, we have f
, and we write f j = f j i . In order to prove the FMNE Conjecture for this type of Nash equilibria we will use the following formula for the social cost of any Nash equilibrium P in this setting.
Theorem 2. In case of two users with identical traffics on m related links, the social cost of any Nash equilibrium P is
We now show that we only have to consider Nash equilibria P of certain structure. . Recall that in the case of identical capacities, the fully mixed Nash equilibrium F exists always (that is, for all traffic vectors w). Hence, we will show that for any other Nash equilibrium P, SC (w, P) ≤ SC (w, F). Fix any Nash equilibrium P. We can identify three sets of users in P: U 1 = {i : support(i) = {1}}, U 2 = {i : support(i) = {2}} and U 12 = {i : support(i) = {1, 2}}. There are u = min(|U 1 |, |U 2 |) (pure) users, which choose link 1 and link 2, respectively, with probability 1. Therefore, SC(w, P) = SC(w, P ) + u, where P is the Nash equilibrium derived from P by omitting those 2u users. We will show, that SC (w, F ) ≥ SC (w, P ) for the fully mixed Nash equilibrium F of n − 2u users. As SC (w, F) > SC (w, F ) + 2u (Lemma 5), this will prove the theorem. Without loss of generality, we can assume that P is of the following form: r (pure) users go on link 1 with probability 1, and n − r users choose both links with positive probability. We write P r for this kind of Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 5. For the fully mixed Nash equilibrium F,
Lemma 6. For the Nash equilibrium P r with two sets of users U 1 = {i : support(i) = {1}} and U 12 = {i : support(i) = {1, 2}} with |U 1 | = r < n and |U 12 | = n − r the Nash probabilities are
, and q := p
, for all users i ∈ U 12 . Furthermore, n > 2r + 1 holds.
Lemma 7.
The social cost of the Nash equilibrium P r is given by
The proof is completed by showing that ∆ := SC (w, F) − SC (w, P r ) ≥ 0.
Unrelated Links
In this section, we consider the case of unrelated links. We prove Proof. Clearly, the social cost of any pure Nash equilibrium P is equal to the selfish cost of some user, while the social cost of a fully mixed Nash equilibrium F is at least the selfish cost of any user. Hence, Proposition 1 implies the claim. We remark that Theorem 6 generalizes Corollary 1 to the case of unrelated links. We finally prove: 
Conclusion and Directions for Further Research
We have verified the FMNE Conjecture over several interesting restrictions of the selfish routing game we considered for the case of related links. We have also investigated the FMNE Conjecture in the case of unrelated links, for which we have identified instances of the game that validate and falsify the FMNE Conjecture, respectively. The most obvious problem left open by our work is to establish the FMNE Conjecture in its full generality for the case of related links. We hope that several of the combinatorial techniques introduced in this work for settling special cases of the conjecture may be handy for the general case. The FMNE Conjecture attempts to study a possible order on the set of Nash equilibria (for the specific selfish routing game we consider) that is defined with respect to their social costs; in the terminology of partially ordered sets, the FMNE Conjecture asserts that the fully mixed Nash equilibrium is a maximal element of the defined order. We feel that this order deserves further study. For example, what are the minimal elements of the order? More generally, is there a characterization of measures on Nash equilibria such that the fully mixed Nash equilibrium is a maximal element of the order defined with respect to any specific measure? (Our study considers the social cost as one such measure of interest.)
